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ABSTRACT
Network attacks, including Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS),
continuously increase in terms of bandwidth along with damage
(recent attacks exceed 1.7 Tbps) and have a devastating impact on
the targeted companies/governments. Over the years, mitigation
techniques, ranging from blackholing to policy-based filtering at
routers, and on to traffic scrubbing, have been added to the network
operator’s toolbox. Even though these mitigation techniques pro-
vide some protection, they either yield severe collateral damage, e.g.,
dropping legitimate traffic (blackholing), are cost-intensive, or do
not scale well for Tbps level attacks (ACL filtering, traffic scrubbing),
or require cooperation and sharing of resources (Flowspec).
In this paper, we propose Advanced Blackholing and its system
realization Stellar. Advanced blackholing builds upon the scalability
of blackholing while limiting collateral damage by increasing its
granularity. Moreover, Stellar reduces the required level of coopera-
tion to enhance mitigation effectiveness. We show that fine-grained
blackholing can be realized, e.g., at a major IXP, by combining
available hardware filters with novel signaling mechanisms. We
evaluate the scalability and performance of Stellar at a large IXP
that interconnects more than 800 networks, exchanges more than
6 Tbps traffic, and witnesses many network attacks every day. Our
results show that network attacks, e.g., DDoS amplification attacks,
can be successfully mitigated while the networks and services under
attack continue to operate untroubled.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The revolution of the digital age fueled by the Internet has attracted
the good but the evil alike. While the threats executed over the In-
ternet are multifaceted from a criminalistics perspective, e.g., fraud,
data and identity theft, espionage, or cyber terrorism, the dominant
network threat is Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [2]. The goal of
DoS attacks is to force a service or system to become unavailable
by consuming crucial resources. These resources can be computing
power at the servers or exploitation of application-layer vulnerabil-
ities, i.e., semantic attacks, or network bandwidth, i.e., volumetric
attacks. To conduct such volumetric attacks, adversaries often use
Distributed DoS (DDoS). Traffic from numerous distributed sources
is generated and steered towards a target service to make it un-
available. Once the network links to the target are congested due
to the DDoS attack, legitimate traffic that traverses the same links
is also affected.
DDoS threats are continuously increasing in terms of volume, fre-
quency, and complexity. While the largest observed and publicly re-
ported attacks were between 50 to 200 Gbps before 2015 [59, 60, 70],
current peaks are an order of magnitude higher and exceeded 1
Tbps [9, 48] in 2016, and 1.7 Tbps [57] in early 2018. We also ob-
serve a massive rise in the number of DDoS attacks. Jonker et
al. [41] report that a third of all active /24 networks were targeted
by DDoS attacks between 2016 and 2017. Similar observations are
reported by the security industry [3, 19]. A particularly prominent
DDoS attack type is amplification attacks [64, 65]. They take advan-
tage of protocol design flaws, whereby a relatively small request
triggers a significantly larger response. With a spoofed source IP
address [49] the response traffic is amplified and reflected to the
target. Vulnerable protocols include classical protocols such as NTP,
DNS, and/or SNMP [20, 64], as well as relatively new protocols, e.g.,
DNSSEC [74] and memcached [5, 57]. Amplification factors of up
to 50, 000× have been witnessed in the wild [73]. To exemplify, a
request of 15 bytes can trigger a 750 Kbytes response.
1.1 DDoS Mitigation: State of the Art
This alarming increase in DDoS attacks and their sophistication
and severity, e.g., see [56, 77], demands scalable yet cost-effective
countermeasures. However, at this point, we are left with various
mitigation techniques and tools that can partially counteract the
impact of the attacks. These include: (i) Traffic Scrubbing Services
(TSS), (ii) Router Access Control List Filters (ACL), (iii) Remotely
Triggered Black Hole (RTBH), and (iv) BGP Flowspec.
Traffic Scrubbing Services (TSS): offer all-round carefree ser-
vices to their subscribers. They redirect the traffic of a service to
specialized hardware either via DNS redirection or BGP delega-
tion [43]. There they classify traffic as unwanted or benign and
send the benign “scrubbed” traffic to its original destination or move
the destination to their network [4, 30, 43, 75]. The convenience and
fine-grained filtering of TSS comes at significant recurring costs
and requires in-time subscription and setup. Moreover, it currently
has inherent limitations, e.g., per packet or per flow processing for
deep packet inspection, which can reduce effectiveness [75] and
does not cope with Tbps-level attacks [48]. Moreover, it may reroute
traffic and, thus, impose performance penalties, and is vulnerable
to evasion tactics [42].
ACL Filters: are often used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) to overcome specific network
problems. They deploy policy-based filters that drop unwanted traf-
fic at their AS border routers. The implementations and capabilities
depend on the vendor-specific hardware, e.g., ACL rules or QoS
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classifiers. Such filters can work well if the hardware is homoge-
neous, the network engineers have sufficient expertise, and the
network management system supports the automated deployment
of filters. However, such systems typically do not scale well and,
given that the filtering location is beyond the ingress points of the
network, the bandwidth to a neighbor AS can still be exhausted.
Remotely Triggered Black Hole (RTBH): also referred to as
BGP Blackholing, is an operational DDoS mitigation technique [16].
ASes under attack can signal upstream ISPs [24, 40] or IXPs [22, 50]
to drop traffic to specific IP prefixes. Using BGP to trigger blackhol-
ing is simple to realize and lowers the entry barrier for ASes, but
limits the level of granularity of the blackhole (to IP prefixes) and
the acceptance of neighboring ASes. Despite substantial growth
of blackholing usage (it quadrupled between 2015 and 2017 [33])
that is evidence of its effectiveness to drop large volumes of attack
traffic [26], unfortunately, it is coarse-grained. BGP blackholing also
drops legitimate traffic to the prefix under attack and thereby causes
collateral damage. Essentially, this makes the IP prefix partially un-
reachable. For RTBH to be effective, cooperation between network
operators to act upon receiving a blackhole signal (typically, a BGP
community) is required, see Section 2. Namely, it requires that BGP
messages for prefixes more specific than /24 in IPv4 are propagated,
thus, networks operators have to set up exceptions for blackholing
to accept BGP messages such prefixes, e.g., /32 in IPv4.
BGP Flowspec: the BGP flow specification feature, also referred
to as Flowspec, allows the deployment and propagation of more
fine-grained filters (compared to RTBH) across AS domain bor-
ders, e.g., to mitigate DDoS attacks [18]. Flow specifications can
match a particular flow with a source, destination, layer-4 (L4)
parameters, packet characteristics such as length and fragment,
and allow to specify a drop rate limit. Flowspec has received some
adoption in intra-domain environments and has been shown to
have good reaction time and performance [11, 66]. However, in the
inter-domain environment, Flowspec has received little attention.
Among the reasons is that in this environment it relies on trust and
cooperation among different networks, as well as on the sharing of
computational and network resources. In other words, providing
one’s resources to solve someone else’s problem. This also raises
liability questions, thus, it is challenging to implement in a highly
competitive environment.
In summary, all of the above techniques can help mitigate DDoS.
However, each of the above solutions has its own significant short-
comings. Among the main limitations of TSS is its cost and resource
hunger. Among the drawbacks of ACL filters are the limited scal-
ability and the demand for customization. RTBH suffers from its
coarseness and the fact that it requires cooperation between ISPs
and/or IXPs to make the service effective. Thus, compliance with
RTBH signaling is complicated. Flowspec is not a popular choice in
the inter-domain environment as it relies on trust and a high degree
of cooperation among, potentially, competitive networks. More-
over, only TSS provides networks under attack feedback (telemetry)
regarding the state and volume of the attack, i.e., if it is still on-
going or is over. Flowspec standardization [52] only recommends
telemetry but ultimately it is a vendor-specific implementation. For
a summary of the pros and cons see Table 1.
TSS ACL RTBH Flowspec Advanced
filters Blackholing
Granularity ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓
Signaling complexity ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Cooperation • • ✗ ✗ ✓
Resource sharing ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Telemetry ✓ ✗ ✗ • ✓
Scalability ✗ • ✓ ✓ ✓
Resources ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
Performance ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Reaction time ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
Costs ✗ • ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 1: Advanced Blackholing vs. DDoS mitigation solu-
tions. ✓: advantage, ✗: disadvantage, •: neutral.
1.2 Advanced Blackholing in a Nutshell
In this paper, we propose another approach for attack mitigation,
called Advanced Blackholing (Advanced BH). Advanced Blackhol-
ing does not require trust, cooperation, and sharing of resources
among networks. It builds upon the excellent scalability of RTBH
(to aggressively drop volumetric attack traffic) while incorporating
the good properties of ACLs, Flowspec, and TSS (fine-granular fil-
tering) in a lightweight fashion. Thus, Advanced Blackholing offers
a new service in between RTBH and TSS and, as we will show, it
can be deployed at scale, e.g., at IXPs.
IXPs offer an ideal deployment location for DDoS traffic mitiga-
tion as many ISPs use them to exchange traffic, e.g., more than 800
networks and more than 6 Tbps at DE-CIX in Frankfurt or AMS-IX
in Amsterdam. Notice that by enabling such a service in one of
these large IXPs, hundreds of member networks (as well as their
customers and peer networks) will immediately benefit without
the need to change anything else in the Internet protocols and the
operation of the member networks, and without cooperation and
coordination between two member networks. Previous examples
of such innovation includes SDX [14, 15, 36, 37]. IXPs can also
easily absorb the largest attacks seen to date1[7, 21, 57], as they
have Tbps of capacity before the attack reaches the ports (Gbps of
capacity) of their members. Moreover, IXPs have existing routing
infrastructure via the route servers [63], they have experienced
network management teams, and they are increasingly hosting
critical infrastructure, such as root DNS and NTP servers [71].
On the data plane, Advanced Blackholing combines on demand
fine-grained filtering based on layer 2 − 4 header information with
rate limiting. This can be done via vendor specific filters or SDN
OpenFlow rules. IXP members can trigger Advanced Blackholing
filters either via BGP attributes or SDN on their ports to drop or
shape attack traffic. Thus, Advanced Blackholing achieves scalable
scrubbing while giving feedback about the state and volume of the
attack (telemetry) to the Advanced Blackholing users.
Our prototype, Stellar2, relies on filtering and rate limiting of
traffic and on BGP communities for signaling. We focus on the latter
for the prototype to enable fast adoption in practice. Moreover, we
show that Stellar requires no configuration by the IXP members,
1Examples: DE-CIX has 25 Tbps connected capacity [21]; AMS-IX has 26 Tbps con-
nected capacity [7]; to the best of the knowledge of the authors, the largest DDoS
attack reported to date did not exceed 1.7 Tbps [57].
2In astronomy, a stellar object is an object of great mass but not large enough to
be characterized as a black hole. Thus, some objects escape from its attraction. This
analogy describes how Advanced Blackholing differs from RTBH.
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light configuration by the IXP operator, and the attack traffic is
dropped at the IXP.
Thus, in summary, our major contributions are:
• We underline the need for Advanced Blackholing via a mea-
surement study of a current RTBH service and highlight
shortcomings including collateral damage, lack of granu-
larity, and lack of honoring of RTBH signals. For example,
for many attacks most of the attack traffic could have been
removed by more fine-grained filters, e.g., application port
specific filters, without any collateral damage. Moreover, due
to the complex signaling of RTBH, to our surprise, more than
two thirds of the IXP members do not react to RTBH signals.
• We introduce and present Advanced Blackholing, a newmiti-
gation technique which keeps the advantages of RTBHwhile
incorporating the advantages of ACL filters and the power
of fine-grained filtering of Flowspec and traffic scrubbing.
• We describe the design and implementation of the Stellar
system, which realizes Advanced Blackholing at a major Eu-
ropean IXP. We report on our initial experience with it to
mitigate attacks.
Overall, our novel mitigation technique Advanced Blackholing
tackles DDoS mitigation while not suffering from the disadvantages
of limited scalability, need for cooperation, and high costs. Thus,
it can cope with increasingly popular Tbps-level attacks while the
networks and services under attack continue to operate as usual.
2 RTBH LIMITATIONS
Before delving into the details of blackholing, we provide the nec-
essary IXP background and insights on how RTBH is deployed at
IXPs. Then we collect and analyze traffic flows at a large IXP during
attacks. To our surprise, we notice that the majority of the IXP
members do not honor RTBH signals, i.e., they do not drop attack
traffic for prefixes that are tagged with blackholing communities.
2.1 IXPs 101
An IXP, see Figure 1, consists of two major components, namely
a switching fabric and a route server. The switching fabric – the
IXP data plane – is a layer-2 (L2) infrastructure for exchanging
traffic between IXP members (see solid lines). On the control plane
IXPs offer two options: (a) direct bi-lateral peering between IXP
members [1, 14] enabled by the data plane, or (b) via a route server
(multi-lateral peering) [34, 63]. With an increasing number of mem-
bers, many medium to large IXPs offer route servers as free value-
added services to their members. Route servers enable peering at
scale, i.e., with a single BGP session (see dashed arrows) a member
can establish peerings (exchange routes and interconnect) with all
other route server users that would require a separate BGP session
with each one of them.
AS1
IXP
route 
server
AS3
AS2
AS4
Figure 1: An IXP overview.
2.2 DDoS Mitigation at IXPs
IXP members can use the route server to steer their announcements
by annotating themwith BGP communities. Examples include selec-
tive advertisements to certain peers or advertisements to all/none.
IXP members can also use the IXP’s blackholing service to drop
traffic destined to a prefix that they announce. Therefore, the prefix
owner advertises the prefix to the route server along with an IXP
BGP blackholing community [26]. Such communities are known to
the IXP members and in many cases, this information is publicly
available on the IXP’s website. The number of ASes that use black-
holing globally has quadrupled in the last three years, 60% of which
rely on the IXP-based variant [33].
Consider the scenario in Figure 2(a). AS1 advertises the prefix
100.10.10.0/24, see Figure 2(a) (top). Now an adversary attacks a
web service that is running on IP address 100.10.10.10, which is
part of the advertised prefix. The consequence is that users from nei-
ther AS2 nor AS3 can use the service due to the overloaded network
port of AS1, see Figure 2(a) (bottom). Now, AS1 uses the IXP’s black-
hole service by sending an update for 100.10.10.10/32 annotated
with the standardized blackhole community (IXP_ASN:666). The
route server propagates this update to the other peers, namely AS2
and AS3 as shown in Figure 2(b) (top). If an AS (e.g., AS2) accepts
the announcement, the next hop IP is changed to the IXP’s black-
holing IP. This ensures that traffic to this prefix via AS2 is dropped
at the IXP’s null interface as shown in Figure 2(b) (bottom). Notice
that this causes collateral damage because all the legitimate traffic
via AS2 is also dropped. If an AS (e.g., AS3) does not honor the
update, neither attack traffic nor legitimate traffic is dropped. This
implies that if the majority of the attack is via AS3, the attempted
mitigation fails. Recall, IXPs are typically carrier and policy neutral.
They will only blackhole traffic if the owner3 of the prefix instructs
them to do so.
2.3 RTBH: Collateral Damage
RTBH is heavily used [33], but suffers from severe shortcomings [26].
To underline the extent of RTBH collateral damage, we rely on IP-
FIX data from one of the largest European IXPs and refer to it as
L-IXP. We focus on a memcached amplification attack [64, 73] from
the 29th April 2018. It lasted for several hours with traffic levels
of up to 40 Gbps. Figure 2(c) shows the normalized traffic towards
the target IXP member (mainly an IPv4 /32) before and during the
attack. The IP appears to host a Web service as is evident from the
port usage of 443 (HTTPS) and 80/8080 (HTTP) before the attack.
At 20:21 CET, we observe a sudden and huge increase in the relative
3Typically, the IXPs require the members to register the ownership of their prefixes
in Internet Routing Registries (IRR), and check before they accept announcements of
prefixes at the route server [63].
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(a) Attack scenario.
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(b) Mitigation via RTBH.
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(c) Collateral damage of RTBH.
Figure 2: IXP: Attacks and their mitigation using RTBH.
volume for UDP port 11211. This is a classical signature of an am-
plification attack. With RTBH, all traffic to this IP is dropped. This
includes the remaining legitimate Web traffic. Ideally, one would
blackhole only traffic from port 11211 so that the fraction of Web
traffic would return to its typical level. In this case there would be
no or minimal collateral damage. Indeed, the potential of collateral
damage is even worse if an IP is shared among multiple co-location
services and/or across tenants, e.g., at a cloud provider.
So far, we focus on the overall traffic to an IP under attack via
the IXP. Next, we compute the relative port distribution for all
blackholing traffic during the two last weeks of April 20184, see Fig-
ure 3(a). We compare its port distribution to that of non-blackholed
traffic. Significant differences are identified by using a one-tailed
Welch’s unequal variances t-test with significance level 0.02, i.e., a
non-existing difference may only be measured with a probability
of 2%. All differences are significant.
We find that L4 ports 0, 123, 389, 11211, 53, 19 are the most
prominent ones to show increased traffic volume. These ports and
their associated applications (NTP, LDAP, memcached, domain,
and chargen) are known to be highly susceptible to (amplification)
DDoS attacks [5, 20, 39, 64, 73]. The source port distribution of
all other—not blackholed—traffic is very different. We notice that
the UDP accounts for 99.94% of the blackholed traffic while the
share of TCP is as low as 0.03%. This has to be expected, as TCP
is a connection-oriented protocol. If one direction is broken, e.g.,
via RTBH, no TCP connection can be successful. Thus, the small
fraction of TCP control packets in the blackhole can relate to a much
larger potential traffic share that is likely collateral damage. After
all, TCP in non-blackholed traffic accounts for 86.81%. In summary,
we find that UDP and amplification attack prone ports are dominant
when analyzing attack traffic and that there is a significant risk of
blocking legitimate traffic.
4We focus on IPv4 traffic as IPv6 blackholing traffic is less than 1% of the overall
blackholing traffic. More than 98% of the blackholed prefixes are IPv4 /32 addresses.
2.4 RTBH: Compliance Check
From Figure 2(c) we also notice that the attack is persistent and
upon further investigation, we find that a large number of peers
are involved. This motivates us to explore to what extent IXP mem-
bers honor the signal to blackhole a specific prefix. We find, see
Figure 3(b), that for more than 93% of the blackholing events, the
prefix owner asks all route server participants (using an IXP BGP
community without exceptions) to blackhole the traffic. However,
almost 70% of these IXP members do not honor the blackholing
community. Among the possible reasons are: (a) they choose to not
participate in RTBH, (b) they do not accept updates for more specific
prefixes than /24 because this requires some changes to the default
configurations, or (c) they made a mistake in their configuration
(fat-finger error).
To assess the effectiveness of current RTBH we perform a con-
trolled experiment towards a test web server we operate. More
specifically, we run an active experiment that attacks a single IPv4
(/32) address that we operate in our AS using a booter service [68].
To comply with measurements ethics we carefully design the exper-
iment and take a number of measures: (a) inform and synchronize
with the IXP operator about the attack, (b) take precaution that
sufficient network bandwidth is available so that the likelihood of
members being harmed by the targeted attack is minimized, (c) use
an experimental AS with no customer traffic that we operate and
is a member of the IXP, (d) utilize an unused /24 prefix that was
allocated and announced only for the purpose of the experiment,
(e) are prepared to shut down the experimental AS and stop the
traffic by withdrawing the /24, and (f) run the experiment for a
short duration (10 minutes).
The experimental AS receives routes from more than 650 IXP
members (ASes) at the IXP route server via multi-lateral peering. It
does not have any bilateral peerings. When launching the attack
via the booter service, we request a short-duration attack (less than
10 minutes) of peak traffic of about 1 Gbps, whereby 10 Gbps is the
port capacity of the experimental AS at the IXP. 280 seconds after
the start of the attack the experimental AS signals an RTBH route
update for the /32 prefix with the IXP blackholing community to
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Figure 3: Properties and shortcomings of RTBH.
the route server. Figure 3(c) shows the result of the attack as well
as the impact of the blackhole mitigation.
We observe that the DDoS attack increases the traffic levels
to slightly less than 1 Gbps at its peak. Traffic is being received
via quite diverse network paths from almost 40 different peers.
Interestingly, RTBH has little effect on the traffic volume. It still
amounts to roughly 600 to 800 Mbps. We note that the number of
peers that the traffic is received from has decreased by only 25%.
The reason that it does not decrease further is that the other ASes
did not accept the /32 blackholing announcement. This underlines
why RTBH by itself is not a sufficient DDoS mitigation technique.
3 ADVANCED BLACKHOLING CONCEPT
Given the major limitations of existing DDoS mitigation techniques,
we propose Advanced Blackholing which combines the advantages
of RTBH, i.e., easily dropping volumetric attack traffic, with some of
the granularity of ACL filters and traffic scrubbing services. To do
so, we first present the corresponding design requirements before
presenting our concept.
3.1 DDoS Mitigation: Requirements
To tackle the challenges imposed by the ever increasing DDoS
attacks we need to (i) improve our mitigation techniques to keep
up the arms race with ever more frequent attacks and their raising
traffic levels [41, 57], and (ii) remain cost-effective and with as
little overhead as possible. In detail, we should meet the following
requirements.
Granularity: Coarse-grained filtering is cost-effective but im-
poses significant collateral damage, see Section 2.3. We argue for
a mechanism that can offer fine-grained filtering and operates on
arbitrary, customizable source and destination packet header fields,
i.e., MAC, IP, transport protocol, transport layer port, and meaning-
ful combinations of them. While sacrificing some granularity, we
can gain efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Thus, this is a desirable
sweet spot.
Signaling complexity: For mitigation to be effective, it needs
to be responsive, effective for any given attack, and easy to use.
Current mitigation solutions may involve many stakeholders, e.g.,
for RTBH at IXPs all members should participate. Aswe also showed
in Section 2.4, the level of compliance to RTBH signaling is very
low. For traffic scrubbing services, contracts are necessary which
may require a setup time and traffic may have to be rerouted [43].
Thus, the required signaling complexity can be significant, as many
parties may have to honor more specific prefixes than used in
regular routing.
Cooperation: RTBH requires cooperation among network op-
erators to act upon receiving a prefix with a blackhole community.
Flowspec inherits this requirement, and it also relies on trust and
resource sharing when it is applied in the inter-domain environ-
ment [66]. Unfortunately, these requirements are hard to satisfy
when networks with diverse resources as well as different or even
conflicting policies and business strategies form the Internet. Thus,
Advanced Blackholing should lower the necessary levels of cooper-
ation among the involved networks and ideally not require changes
in the operation of these networks.
Telemetry:Amajor challenge in DDoSmitigation is the victims’
ability to determine when an attack is over. They have to either get
direct feedback from the scrubbing service or terminate the RTBH,
ACL filter, or the scrubbing which may lead to immediate conges-
tion if the attack is still ongoing. Such probing behavior has been
observed in practice [26, 33]. Thus, we argue that a well-designed
DDoS mitigation system should enable the network under attack
to still receive telemetry information about the status of the attack.
This can, e.g., be a well-defined sub-sample of the attack traffic,
which does not exceed a fixed reserved bandwidth share. Moreover,
traffic statistics about the discarded traffic should be made available
to inform operational decisions including terminating or triggering
further mitigation actions.
Scalability: DDoS mitigation has to scale along many dimen-
sions including (a) performance (number of attacks and volume of
attack traffic), (b) filtering resources (on both the data and control
plane), (c) reaction time (until mitigation takes effect), (d) configura-
tion complexity, and (e) number of users of the mitigation technique.
Hereby, understanding the hardware limitations of network devices
can be a major challenge due to the closed source mentality of many
network hardware vendors.
Cost: The challenge here is to meet the above design require-
ments while keeping costs low. Costs include but are not limited
to hardware, software, configuration, management, and human
resources.
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3.2 Our Proposal: Advanced Blackholing
The focus of our proposal are IXPs. They are ideal locations for
deploying DDoS mitigation services as they are open to innovation,
have experience with DDoS services already (RTBH), are carrier
and policy neutral, carry large volumes of traffic, and have a large
member base already. Moreover, the IXP hardware is in principle
capable of processing extra capacity and performing filtering at
scale and on demand.
We propose Advanced Blackholing, a network attack miti-
gation concept for protecting IXP members (e.g., their IXP port,
internal network, or Web service) from DDoS attacks. Advanced
Blackholing builds upon RTBH but allows configuring fine-grained
filtering and shaping rules directly in the IXP’s hardware. By doing
so, it reduces signaling complexity from one-to-all communication
to one-to-IXP communication. Thereby, Advanced Blackholing en-
ables better traffic filtering, a simple signaling interface at the IXP
that does not need cooperation among peers, traffic telemetry for
discarded packets, and a scalable architecture to handle the volume
and frequency of future large-scale DDoS attacks with minimal
additional cost.
To filter unwanted traffic with Advanced Blackholing, fine-grain-
ed filter rules are instantiated by the IXP on behalf of a member
who owns the IP address under attack. The filtering rules, in the
remainder of the paper referred to as blackholing rules, can be a
combination of L2-L4 header information, including MAC and IP
address (IPv4 and IPv6), transport protocol, or TCP/UDP port. To
request a blackholing rule the member signals its request to the
IXP. For this purpose, Advanced Blackholing can leverage protocols
such as BGP, which enables in-band network specific inter-domain
signaling, or remote customer facing APIs. Since the victim AS and
IXP are the only involved parties, no further cooperation of the
other members is required.
Advanced Blackholing, in contrast to RTBH, is not an all-or-
nothing approach. It supports rate-limiting traffic matching a black-
holing rule. Thus, valuable telemetry about the state of the attack
or forensics after the incident can be collected and analyzed directly
by the IXP member. We show that realizing Advanced Blackholing
is possible with existing hardware deployed at IXPs. It can also
be realized within an SDX [8, 37]. Both realizations ensure that
the needed data and control plane resources are within the IXP’s
operational boundaries while offering good filter update rates and
reaction times. Indeed, Advanced Blackholing scales up to the point
where attacks exceed the IXP’s connected capacity, e.g., 25 Tbps
connected member capacity at DE-CIX Frankfurt in Summer of
2017 [21].
3.3 Advanced Blackholing: An Example
To highlight the benefits of Advanced Blackholing, Figure 4 revisits
the previous IXP toy example (introduced in Section 2.2), now with
an Advanced Blackholing system. On the control plane (top) Ad-
vanced Blackholing is triggered by signaling an IP (100.10.10.10
/32) with the ADV_BH signal, e.g., the NTP port (IXP:123), via a
single BGP announcement (if BGP communities are used for signal-
ing). This signal is received by the route server which forwards the
signal to the IXP’s Advanced Blackholing tool-chain. Next, the de-
sired filter/shaper is deployed within the IXP’s data plane. Thus, the
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Figure 4: Example scenario of Advanced Blackholing.
unwanted attack traffic, e.g., an NTP amplification attack, is filtered
but benign web traffic, e.g., HTTP/HTTPS is still forwarded. Con-
sequently, congestion at AS1’s IXP port and interior network are
resolved and the Web service is restored. The DDoS amplification
attack is mitigated.
Notice that with Advanced Blackholing the risk of collateral
damage is minimized. Moreover, Advanced Blackholing does not
require the cooperation of all IXP members (in this case AS2 and
AS3). It suffices that the IXP’s blackholing controller honors the
/32 announcement.
4 STELLAR: ADVANCED BLACKHOLING
SYSTEM
We build Stellar to realize the benefits of Advanced Blackholing. To
encapsulate functionality, we discuss alternative design options and
highlight the advantages of the chosen implementations. Stellar’s
design consists of three layers: signaling,management, and filtering,
see Figure 5. Signaling handles the IXP members’ signal to discard
traffic according to well-defined filter rules (the blackholing rules)
and forwards them to the blackholing manager. In addition, signal-
ing assures resilience (fall back, member state), consistency (authen-
tication), and security (authorization). The blackholingmanager—as
part of management—holds the state of all signaled blackholing
rules from all IXP members and resolves existing conflicts. At the
same time, the blackholing manager compiles the blackholing rules
to IXP hardware specific configurations. Those are deployed on
the distributed switching fabric to drop or shape traffic (filtering).
In this way, we encapsulate hardware and vendor specific aspects
including configuration, parameters, and hardware capabilities.
Stellar’s architecture respects the fact that IXPs per se offer L2
connectivity only. While member ASes communicate reachability
via BGP (L3) they cannot directly interact with the IXP’s forwarding
infrastructure (IXP data plane) via L3. Such interactions are only
feasible via other member’s routers or the route server (control
plane). Our proposed system architecture respects this design and
augments it with a well-defined cross-layer interface to enable
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members to use the IXP’s hardware for the purpose of network
attack mitigation.
4.1 Implementation Constraints
Stellar’s implementation is subject to constraints imposed by both
IXP members as well as IXP operators.
4.1.1 IXP Member Constraints. To facilitate fast and seamless
adoption of Stellar it is imperative to keep the entrance barrier
low. Thus, as Advanced Blackholing extends the capabilities of
RTBH, the signaling layer should be implemented in a way that
allows IXP members to continue using their existing blackholing
toolchains. Moreover, no major configuration updates or system
upgrades should be required. The current state-of-the-art signaling
for RTBH is to annotate BGP announcements with the standardized
blackholing community [47]. Consequently, a signaling mechanism
on top of BGP is favorable but challenging given BGP’s limited
expressiveness and extensibility. Yet another constraint is BGP’s se-
curity design, which comes with a number of shortcomings, namely,
prefixes are hijacked [69], limited adoption of prefix authentica-
tion [35], lack of cryptographic integrity and authenticity over BGP
attributes [72], AS paths (or any other attribute) are modified for
traffic engineering [61], and routing tables are flooded with more
specifics [51].
4.1.2 IXP Operator Constraints. To be economically affordable,
new services should be seamlessly integrated in the existing IXP sys-
tem landscape. This includes interoperability with existing configu-
ration management, monitoring, and even provisioning processes
to keep additional operational costs (OPEX) low. For performance
reasons filtering implementation in hardware is obligatory. Yet
most hardware has limits, e.g., number of filters per port or line
card, and kind of filters. Still, it is economically critical to exploit
existing hardware resources and to rely only on new or additional
hardware if inevitable, to keep capital expenditure (CAPEX) low.
Even adding an edge switch at a major IXP already easily exceeds
several millions of euros. Thus, filtering should be realized using
the capabilities of existing hardware. Moreover, as IXPs are critical
infrastructure [23, 27] their availability is indispensable. Traffic for-
warding has to be guaranteed at all times. This constraint implies
that: (i) filtering has to be highly resilient and include fallbacks
towards simple forwarding of all traffic; (ii) management has to do
“admission control” (limit the number of blackholing rules) to en-
sure that the hardware resource limitations of the IXP’s forwarding
hardware are respected.
4.2 Implementation Choices
While there are many implementation options, the choices for the
signaling interface and the filter implementation based on the above
constraints are critical for Stellar.
4.2.1 Signaling Interface. The member ASes communicate with
Stellar through a signaling interface of the IXP. It must enable
a member to express blackholing rules, signal new ones, update
existing ones, withdraw them, and implicitly withdraw them (in
case of system failures). Thus, the choice of how to interact with the
IXP is essential. Among the candidates are: remote (i) Application
Programming Interface (API), (ii) BGP-4, (iii) BGP with Flowspec, or
(iv) BGP with extended communities.
APIs: are a well-established way to interact across system bound-
aries and can be designed to scale, perform, be highly available, and
secure. However, in inter-domain settings public remote APIs are
rarely used since they introduce potential points of failures and in-
troduce complexity. Moreover, APIs are alien to network engineers
and their default toolbox.
BGP-4: Network engineers favor in-band protocols, here BGP.
However, BGP-4 [62] per se does not offer the capabilities to signal
anything more specific than a /32 prefix (single IPv4 address) or
/128 for IPv6 respectively.
Flowspec: To tackle the above limitations, numerous extensions
were introduced including Flowspec – “Dissemination of Flow Spec-
ification Rules” [52]. Flowspec defines the BGP Network Layer
Reachability Information (NLRI) encoding format to distribute fine-
grained L2-L4 traffic flow specifications. At first glance, Flowspec
appears to be a perfect candidate as signaling interface, in particular,
as inter-domain cooperation and coordination for traffic filtering is
one of the highlighted use cases [52]. Flowspec is a useful tool for
bilateral peerings among IXP members, but it also requires cooper-
ation and inherits the signaling complexity of blackholing which
can render RTBH ineffective. Furthermore, in practice, Flowspec
announcements consume scarce hardware resources of routers that
are not under the control of the owner and require non-trivial
resource monitoring. Thus, the adoption of Flowspec in the inter-
domain environment is questionable [11, 66] even though most
hardware vendors support it since 2014. For the IXP specific setting,
additional limitations are: (a) lack of Flowspec implementation for
the route server software stack, and (b) no IPv6 standardization [54].
Therefore, we decided against Flowspec for Stellar.
BGP extended communities: An alternative in-band BGP in-
terface that allows communication of meta information to peers is
BGP communities. The “BGP Communities Attribute” [13] intro-
duced in 1996 allows the tagging of routes with numeric values and
is heavily used by ASes, e.g., for traffic engineering [61], network
troubleshooting [29], location information [32], and RTBH [47].
BGP communities are heavily used in inter-domain routing and
IXP settings, and are supported by all route server implementations
as of today. The communities themselves are only tags without
any semantics. Some predefined values have been agreed upon—
the well-known communities—while others are AS or IXP specific.
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We choose BGP extended communities [67] for signaling since ex-
tended communities provide a sufficiently large numbering space
and allow us to define a distinct community namespace for black-
holing rules. This choice satisfies all constraints imposed by IXP
members and IXP operators.
4.2.2 Filtering. The filtering layer must ensure that all port
specific filter rules including blackholing rules are applied to the
traffic. Among the possible choices are: (i) traffic diversion systems,
filtering with SDN hardware, and filtering with vendor specific ACLs.
Traffic diversion systems: either powerful computational clus-
ters [78] or specialized hardware [58], require a substantial invest-
ment into equipment typically not yet integrated in today’s IXP
infrastructure.
SDN hardware: in principle, offers both the ability to configure
via OpenFlow [53] or P4 [10], and realize filters with the match-
action abstraction efficiently [12]. Moreover, with per flow counters
it is possible to gather statistics about filtered as well as forwarded
traffic and, thus, provide telemetry feedback. In principle, SDN
based solutions are a good option. However, at this point most IXPs
are not yet realized as SDX and, accordingly, additional hardware
investments would be mandatory. Even if an IXP decided to make
such an investment, there is a lack of hardware support by vendors
currently.
Filteringwith vendor specificACLs: To achieve a cost-effective
deployment, we need to rely on vendor specific router ACL fea-
tures which are commonly used to realize Quality of Service (QoS)
policies. Such features are offered by almost all switching/routing
hardware vendors under a different name, e.g., Cisco offers Ex-
tended ACLs [17], Juniper offers Firewall Filters [44], and Alcatel
Lucent offers QoS Policies [6]. These ACL features enable dropping,
shaping for telemetry feedback, and forwarding on the data plane.
4.3 Signaling Implementation
In the following, we describe the implementation of Stellar’s signal-
ing layer, i.e., how IXP members signal Advanced Blackholing and
express the concrete blackholing rule by means of BGP, and how
rules are validated and forwarded to the blackholing controller, see
Figure 6.
The central element of Stellar’s signaling is the IXP’s route server,
i.e., the member facing IXP interface which Stellar uses to collect
signals from the members. The route server is placed in the IXP
peering LAN and maintains BGP sessions with all IXP members
(demanded by terms and conditions). The route server collects the
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Figure 7: Management layer implementation.
signals from all members and performs route filtering on import
to assure routing hygiene based on an IXP policy. The IXP policy
ensures that each member can only announce prefixes that are
not in conflict with Internet Route Registry databases (IRRs) [55],
BOGONS [28], and RPKI validation [38]. This does not interfere
with prefix delegations which can be represented by all validation
databases. The benefit of integrating Stellar with the route server is
that we immediately inherit routing hygiene as well as its high avail-
ability design (IXPs multilateral peerings rely on them), member
state monitoring (offered by BGP), and debugging interfaces. For in-
stance, members can rely on looking glasses for debugging [31, 46].
Notably, as opposed to RTBH, the route server does not reflect
signals back to the other members, i.e., signaling only involves the
IXP member under attack and the IXP. Instead, the southbound
interface of the signaling layer connects the route server with the
blackholing controller and consumes the signals. From the route
server perspective the blackholing controller is just an IXP member
router. Nevertheless, there are three main differences. First, the
blackholing controller uses internal BGP (iBGP) instead of external
BGP (eBGP) to ensure forwarding of updates. Consequently, no own
AS number is required. Second, the blackholing controller is passive,
i.e., it only collects announcements but never announces any routes.
Third, the blackholing controller uses BGP’s recently standardized
ADD-PATH capability [76] to bypass BGP best path selection at the
route server. This is essential for a number of corner cases, e.g., to
be able to honor the same prefix from different member ASes with
diverging blackholing rules.
For a member to trigger Stellar to filter traffic destined to a prefix
it needs to annotate the BGP route announcement with a specific
BGP extended community. This community encodes a reference
to a specific blackholing rule, e.g., drop traffic from UDP source
port 123 (NTP), and can be predefined by the IXP or by the IXP
member via a customer portal (self-service portal). Currently, the
IXP offers a shared set of predefined blackholing rules for common
attack patterns but custom blackholing rules can be defined as well.
4.4 Blackholing Management Implementation
Stellar’s management layer consists of two components: A blackhol-
ing controller and a network manager, see Figure 7. The blackholing
controller is responsible for tracking blackholing rules and their
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changes as signaled by the route server on behalf of the members.
The network manager realizes the blackholing rule changes by
computing the hardware specific configuration changes.
The blackholing controller implements a BGP parser and a BGP
processor. The first maintains the iBGP sessionwith the route server
and parses the incoming message stream. The latter processes the
semantics of BGP messages and stores the announced routes in
a Routing Information Base (RIB). Next, the controller calculates
differences between RIB snapshots. Essentially, these differences
represent a set of abstract, i.e., still hardware-independent, config-
uration changes that must be applied to the network to reflect all
requested blackholing rules. These configuration changes are then
forwarded via a software queue to the network manager.
The networkmanager compiles the abstract configuration changes
in hardware specific ones. Notice that a high-level configuration
change may require multiple low-level configuration changes on
several switches. To limit the number of configuration changes
within any time interval to a rate that is manageable by the switch
hardware, the queue uses a Token Bucket algorithm. This ensures
that the configurable Maximum Burst Size (MBS) and a reasonable
long-term rate limit is never exceeded.
The requested configuration changes are dequeued by the net-
work manager. On an abstract level, the network manager compiles
abstract configuration changes as provided by the blackholing con-
troller into hardware-specific ones. Then, the changes are deployed
on the IXP’s forwarding hardware (data plane) while respecting
the hardware limitations of the actual IXP infrastructure. As men-
tioned above, there are multiple different feasible implementations
for the network manager. Indeed, the feasible set depends on the
capabilities of the existing IXP hardware. We realized two solutions,
one using vendor-specific ACL filters to realize QoS policies and
an SDN-based solution. Below, we focus on the former. For details
on the latter, we refer the reader to our recent demo [25] based on
the SDX platform [37].
Each network manager has access to a description of the hard-
ware limitations via a hardware information base. This includes,
e.g., the number of allowed QoS policies per port or the number of
OpenFlow rules that may be installed on a switch. Using this infor-
mation, the configuration compiler can ensure that the limitations
are respected.
4.5 Filtering Implementation (QoS)
Stellar’s filtering component depends primarily on the specific IXP
hardware deployed. Our implementation is targeting deployment at
L-IXP, a major European IXP, with more than 800 members, more
than 6 Tbps peak traffic, and distributed across more than 20 IXP
PoPs in the metropolitan area it operates in. The IXP platform is
not SDN-based and we thus use the implementation option that is
available, namely, QoS policies.
Recall that QoS policies can be applied either on all IXP member
ingress ports or on the destination IXP egress port. In the former
case the traffic is dropped or shaped upon entering the IXP’s plat-
form. In the latter case, it is dropped or shaped upon leaving the
IXP’s platform. We opt for the latter, mainly to minimize the com-
plexity of the configuration procedure. Configuration changes are
minimized, as only the destination port has to be updated rather
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Figure 8: Filtering layer impl. via QoS policies.
than the configurations of all other (n − 1) ports. Moreover, an
update from one IXP member only causes changes to the port con-
figuration of exactly this IXP member. Thus, causality is maintained.
This implementation option is currently possible at L-IXP as it has
(at least today) enough capacity to carry the network attack traf-
fic across the IXP platform to the bottleneck IXP member ports.
Shaping traffic on egress also has the advantage that telemetry
information is made available to the member IXP. Nevertheless,
moving egress filters to ingress filters may be a good choice for
future work and to enable deployment at smaller IXPs where the
platform capacity is a bottleneck.
An overview of how the QoS policies are realized is given in Fig-
ure 8. The policies are IXP port specific QoS dropping and shaping
rules coming from the network manager. These are used to config-
ure the ports, which classify the packet streams. Our configuration
distinguishes between three options, “shape”, “forward”, and “drop”.
Packets tagged with drop are redirected to a zero-length queue for
immediate dropping. Packets tagged with forward are put in the
egress queue of the member port. Packets tagged with shape are put
in a queue which is shaped according to the specification. Packets
passing the shaping queue enter the forward queue.
5 EVALUATION
In this section we first explore how well Stellar scales in the L-IXP
test lab setting and then present how Stellar, when deployed at the
L-IXP, is able to handle network attacks.
5.1 Scaling and Performance
To ensure that Stellar can be deployed at the IXP, it is essential that
the limits of the IXP’s hardware are respected. Thus, we check in a
lab setup: (a) how Stellar scales with an increasing number of filters
and ports, and (b) if the configuration update frequency limits are
sufficient to support Stellar. Our approach mainly aims to measure
the effect of Stellar’s properties on Ternary Content-Addressable
Memory (TCAM) [45]. The TCAM is used to implement matching
header information in hardware. Its size and update behavior con-
stitute the main resource bottleneck of Stellar. We do not measure
traffic bottlenecks as it is difficult to generate enough traffic and
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Figure 9: Stellar scaling limits by IXP member adoption rate: (a) 20% (2× of RTBH users today), (b) 60%, and (c) 100%; N is the
95th percentile of the currently observed parallel RTBHs by any member on any port; OK : no hardware resource depletion,
F1/F2: hardware limit of L3-L4/MAC filters exceeded; an increased adoption rate leads to less available filters per port.
the IXP’s vendor explicitly guarantees support of the relevant fea-
tures in hardware at line rate (verified by observing no impact on
hardware’s CPU utilization).
Our test setup consists of an IXP Edge Router5 (ER), a hardware
accelerated packet generator, a resource monitor, and Stellar. The
ER is configured with a production configuration of more than 350
member ports, which corresponds to the ER with the largest port
density. The evaluation of the scaling limits of the hardware aims to
verify whether there are both sufficient resources per member port
(by increasing the blackholing rules per port) as well as sufficient
system wide hardware resources (by increasing the total number
of QoS policies), as Stellar can exhaust either one. We generate a
number of blackholing rules per port. Each rule uses MAC filters
to filter traffic from a specific AS (as is needed for RTBH policy
control) and a random subset of L3-L4 rules to filter traffic (the
Advanced Blackholing capabilities). We then increase the fraction
of ASes (ports) using Stellar as well as the number of blackholing
rules per port.
Figure 9 shows the limits for three different percentages of IXP
member ASes actively using Stellar. We start at 20%, twice the
percentage of IXP member ASes that currently use RTBH daily, and
go via 60%, a high adoption rate, to 100% IXP member adoption
rate. For each adoption rate we show whether there are sufficient
hardware resources for increasing numbers of QoS filters along
both dimensions, namely, MAC filters (shown on y-axis) and L3-L4
filters (shown on x-axis). OK corresponds to sufficient resources; F1
and F2 correspond to insufficient resources meaning respectively
that the total number of filter criteria for QoS policies (L3-L4) is
exceeded or the maximum number of MAC filters per port (L2) is
exceeded. For each plot, we increase the number of MAC filters from
0 to 10N and the number of L2-L3 filters from 0 to 4N . We choose
N to be the 95th percentile of the number of currently observed
parallel RTBHs on any port by any IXP member. For a more detailed
analysis of current RTBH usage, see [26].
Not surprisingly, the feasible region —e.g., the region marked
OK— decreases when the IXP members are using more blackholing
rules or if more IXP member ASes are using Stellar. Let us consider
the starting point, Figure 9(a): While the number of Stellar users
5IXPs often deploy routers but configure them to act as switches.
corresponds to twice the current (June 2018) users of RTBH, they
each use more rules to take advantage of novel Advanced Black-
holing capabilities. We do not see any scalability limits. Next, see
Figure 9(b), we presume an increased adoption rate to 60% of the
IXP members. There still is a huge headroom for the number of
MAC filters (8N) and the number of L2-L4 filters (3N). With an
adoption rate of 100%, see Figure 9(c), the safety margin decreases
but still is substantial. Note, the experiments presume that every
single IXP member increases their number of parallel blackholing
rules at the same time (a stretch test). Thus, we conclude that Stel-
lar can be deployed without exhausting the IXP platform filtering
resources.
Next, we ask if the hardware can sustain the update frequency
imposed by Advanced Blackholing. A review of Stellar and the
IXP’s ER hardware shows that the limiting factor is the ER’s CPU
resources. Notably, the ER’s control plane runs a real-time OS and
the current configuration imposes a hard CPU limit of 15% for
configuration tasks. To check if this suffices, we measure the ER’s
CPU resources while increasing the number of blackholing rule
addition and removal operations. Figure 10(a) shows how many
rule updates were processed during a five-second interval (scaled
to 1 second) vs. the corresponding CPU usage. With a 15% CPU
usage, the ER can handle a median of 4.33 rule updates per second.
To predict how long it takes until a blackholing rule takes effect,
we perform a controlled experiment on top of the Token Bucket
Queue of the blackholing controller: We enqueue configuration
changes generated from the traces of L-IXP’s RTBH service. These
configuration changes are dequeued with a rate of 4/5 per second,
respectively (to mimic the median rule update rate of 4.33). Fig-
ure 10(b) shows how long each update stays in the queue, i.e., the
time from blackholing signal to configuration. 70% of all configu-
ration changes are well below 1 second and the 95th percentile is
below 100 seconds. Given the setup overhead of alternative solu-
tions, e.g., TSS and ACLs, we consider these results to be acceptable
from an IXP member perspective.
5.2 Functionality
To validate the functionality of Stellar we conduct extensive lab
experiments where we use a hardware accelerated traffic generator
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Figure 10: Evaluation: (a) scalability, (b) blackholing manager queuing rate, and (c) DDoS experiment with Stellar.
to simulate legitimate as well as attack traffic and a high-speed
measurement system on the member’s port to confirm Advanced
Blackholing’s effectiveness. The traffic generator allows us to con-
struct traffic flows with certain properties, for instance a common
UDP source port, at high bandwidth, e.g., to generate NTP, DNS,
and benign traffic with a bandwidth of 10 Gbps. This traffic is then
directed to different IP addresses within an IXP member AS via the
monitored member port—which has a capacity of 1 Gbps and is
immediately congested. Our experiments confirm that the ER with
Stellar behaves as expected: Flows redirected to a dropping queue
are not forwarded to the IXP member, while flows redirected to a
shaping queue share the shaping queue’s rate limit. Flows that are
forwarded share the forwarding queue’s rate limit. By redirecting
the NTP or DNS flows to the dropping or the shaping queue, the
benign traffic flow passes the port untouched, for each targeted IP
address.
5.3 Internet Experiments
To demonstrate the capabilities of Stellar at L-IXP we repeat the
experiment from Section 2.4 (Figure 3(c)). We use the same booter
service as before with the same precautions to launch an active
attack against a single IP address in our experimental AS which
peers at the IXP. However, this time we use Advanced Blackholing
via Stellar. The mitigation—started 200 seconds after the attack—is
highly successful, see Figure 10(c). In more detail, the DDoS attack
starts at 100 seconds and causes an immediate increase to about
1 Gbps of attack traffic from about 60 peers. The attack is an NTP
reflection attack and, thus, we mitigate it by blocking or shaping
traffic from UDP source port 123. Hence, we send a BGP update for
the IP (/32 prefix) tagged with BGP community IXP:2:123. Hereby,
2 refers to UDP source traffic and 123 to port 123. 200 seconds into
the attack we trigger an update, which shapes the traffic to a rate
limit of 200 Mbps for telemetry purposes. We see that the traffic
level indeed quickly drops to 200 Mbps. Note, the number of peers
remains constant. 200 seconds later, we signal Stellar to drop all
UDP and NTP traffic. This reduces traffic close to zero and reduces
the number of peers. The remaining minimal traffic deviation are
mainly ARP traffic from some peers. Thus, Stellar is convincingly
able to mitigate the attack which RTBH (see Figure 3(c)) in contrast
was unable to achieve. Stellar reduces the attack traffic and the
number of peers that send attack traffic, to a shaped minimum or
close to zero.
6 DISCUSSION
Applicability in other network scenarios:We demonstrate the
efficiency of Advanced Blackholing in an IXP setting by implement-
ing and evaluating Stellar at one of the largest IXPs. Nonetheless,
Advanced Blackholing can also be applied to other settings, e.g.,
within an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or any network platform
that handles large numbers of flows. To realize Stellar, the main
ingredients are a filtering mechanism to efficiently discard traffic
and a signaling interface. In an ISP context this can be the top-level
route reflector or the SDN controller in a data center. Thus, we
argue that Stellar (by using alternative options) is deployable in
other settings as well, and as part of our future work we will explore
these.
Improved utilization: Advanced Blackholing allows IXP member
ASes to regain control of their hardware resources, in particular,
their port capacity. Since attack traffic is dropped before using the
member ports’ capacity at the IXP egress, IXP members do not need
to over-provision to cope with volumetric attacks and the imposed
congestion decreases. Rather, the attack traffic is absorbed by the
IXP with its Tbps spare capacity. This is feasible, as IXPs often
deploy large edge routers but configure them to act as switches,
thereby under-utilizing available hardware options. With Stellar
these resources are used to offer a compelling new service. Similar
observations apply to ISPs and data center networks, where it is
again possible to use available resources to drop traffic early.
Combining Advanced Blackholing with other solutions: Ad-
vanced Blackholing can be combined very successfully with other
mitigation techniques, in particular, traffic scrubbing services. These
services can be used to signal Advanced Blackholing to drop traffic
with specific features efficiently. Thus, attacks with known patterns
can be dropped at no cost. This option frees resources for expen-
sive deep packet inspection and machine learning processing used
by traffic scrubbing services to extract patterns of yet unknown
attacks. Moreover, Advanced Blackholing can be used to only send
a limited volume of traffic to the scrubbing service. Thus, Advanced
Blackholing can drastically reduce the cost of scrubbing services
without sacrificing their efficiency. The former is possible as the
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high cost of traffic scrubbing services is caused by first carrying all
traffic to their premises and, then, applying the filters within their
scrubbing clusters—a very expensive constellation. With Stellar, we
can dynamically determine which and how much (sample attack
traffic) reaches a monitor facility, e.g., a scrubbing center. Stellar
together with deep packet inspection of attack traffic can be used
to, e.g., infer attack signatures or an attack start/end.
Limitations: Advanced Blackholing combines the scalability of
blackholing with fine-grained filtering of ACL and scrubbing solu-
tions to combat many but not all attacks. Thus, Advanced Black-
holing can often mitigate volumetric network attacks saturating
the target’s network resources, as well as attacks on specific pro-
tocols that consequently deny specific protocols or services. Still,
it is not designed to handle semantic attacks, i.e., low bandwidth
attacks exploiting specific operating system or application vulner-
abilities, e.g., a kernel or Web server bug. To tackle these, other
techniques, including deep packet inspection and machine learning
approaches are promising candidates. However, if there is a spe-
cific L2-L4 signature of the attack, Advanced Blackholing can even
mitigate these.
7 CONCLUSION
Network attacks are more frequent and voluminous than ever. Re-
cent attacks have taken everybody by surprise as attack traffic
volume is in the order of Tbps, and still growing to set new records.
At this scale, attack mitigation techniques such as traffic scrubbing
and ACL are either inefficient (high set up time, high resource re-
quirements) or are prohibitively expensive. Flowspec, a popular
intra-domain attack mitigation technique, relies on trust, cooper-
ation, and sharing of resources among different networks when
deployed in the inter-domain environment. Unfortunately, these
requirements are hard to satisfy when networks with diverse re-
sources as well as different or even conflicting policies and business
strategies form the Internet. A cheap and highly scalable mitigation
technique is blackholing. Unfortunately, our measurement-driven
analysis shows that blackholing suffers from severe shortcomings,
namely, collateral damage as it drops all traffic to an attack destina-
tion (including legitimate traffic), and has high signaling complexity
that limits effectiveness.
In this paper we argue that a new attack mitigation technique is
needed which inherits the scalability and low cost of blackholing,
does not require cooperation of network operators, while providing
fine-grained filtering, simple signaling, and telemetry capabilities
of expensive techniques such as traffic scrubbing. We propose Ad-
vanced Blackholing, which satisfies all these desired properties.
We design and implement Stellar, and operate it at a large IXP to
make the benefits of Advanced Blackholing available to the hun-
dreds of the IXP member ASes. IXP member ASes can utilize Stellar
with minimal configuration changes to their setup, contrary to
traditional blackholing (RTBH) and other mitigation techniques.
Our evaluation shows that Stellar scales well even if Advanced
Blackholing requests and attack traffic increases at very high levels.
Stellar also allows fast responses and is highly configurable, e.g., it
provides traffic shaping to give telemetry feedback on the attack to
its users. We are currently deploying Stellar as a service at a large
IXP and we plan to install it at other IXPs in the near future.
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